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Abstract
This paper aims to shed light on the emergence of systemic risk
in credit systems. By developing an interbank market with heteroge-
neous financial institutions granting loans on different network struc-
tures, we investigate which market architecture is more resilient to
liquidity shocks and how the risk spreads over the modeled system. In
our model, credit linkages evolve endogenously via a fitness measure
based on different banks’ strategies. Each financial institution, in fact,
applies a strategy based on a low interest rate, a high supply of liquid-
ity or a combination of them. Interestingly, the choice of the strategy
influences both the banks’ performance and the network topology. In
this way, we are able to identify the most effective tactics adapt to
contain contagion and the corresponding network topology. Our anal-
ysis shows that, when financial institutions combine the two strategies,
the interbank network does not condense and this generates the most
efficient scenario in case of shocks.
JEL codes: G01; G02; D85
Keywords: Interbank market; dynamic network; fitness model;
network resilience; bank strategy.
1 Introduction
The role of the financial sector and the effects of financial development
on the economic system have been extensively debated (Schumpeter 1911;
Robinson 1952). Specifically, the development of the financial sector has tra-
ditionally been indicated as a key ingredient of the economic growth (Rajan
and Zingales 1998; Levine 2005), as an instrument to foster entrepreneur-
ship (Black and Strahan 2002) and increase firms’ productivity (Herrera
and Minetti 2007, Dabla Norris et al. 2012). However, recent evidence
has suggested that the rapid flourishing of the finance industry could have
a negative effect on the economic system (Arcand et al. 2011). The fast
expansion of the financial sector in the last decades, therefore, has been
associated with an increased economic instability and fragility and with a
higher systemic vulnerability (Wray 2009; Tridico 2012). In this respect,
the European Central Bank (ECB) itself is worried about the fact the tools
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currently available to monitor financial systems are insufficient (see Trichet
2010). Such inadequacy is also among the major concerns of the European
Commission, which has just created the European Systemic Risk Board.
A general discontent over the ability of our current theoretical frameworks
to fully understand economic systems and evaluate their systemic properties
has led scholars to analyze them in a dynamic way. Specifically, the present
situation is ripe for a change of approach. ECB has officially called for (1)
more integrated systems, (2) a systemic approach that takes into account
the network of financial exposures, and (3) new appropriate systemic risk
indicators (Issing 2009).
Following this line of thought, in this paper, we present a stylized interbank
market and analyze the endogenous source of instability in the credit sys-
tem. By combining network theory and heterogeneous agents approach we
investigate, in an evolutionary framework, the dynamics which are detri-
mental to the financial stability. Specifically, we emphasize the effect of dif-
ferent banks’ strategies and different network architectures on the resiliency
and robustness of the credit system. Indeed, as the economic literature on
contagion has highlighted, the financial market structure and its intercon-
nectedness are key ingredients to explain systemic failure propagation. The
common idea is that two opposite effects interact in credit networks: risk
sharing, which decreases with the network connectivity and systemic risk
that, in contrast, increases with linkages (see, for instance, Allen and Gale
2000, Thurner et al. 2003, Iori et al. 2006, Battiston et al. 2007, Battiston
et al. 2012a,b, Tedeschi et al. 2012).
In confirmation of the results of many of the above mentioned studies, this
work shows that the relationship between connectivity and systemic risk
is not linear but involves different forces. Specifically, agents’ heterogeneity
and their financial fragility seem to be a leading force in generating propaga-
tion of systematic failure. On the one hand, in fact, the possible emergence
of contagion depends crucially on the degree of heterogeneity. Indeed, when
the agents’ balance sheets are heterogeneous, banks are not uniformly ex-
posed to their counter-party. Therefore, if contagion is triggered by the
failure of a big bank, which represents the highest source of exposure for
its creditors, the situation is certainly worse than when agents are homoge-
neous (see Iori et al. 2006; Caccioli et al. 2012; Lenzu and Tedeschi 2012;
Tedeschi et al. 2012). On the other hand, the probability of default in
credit markets is strictly linked to the presence of highly leveraged agents
(see Gonzalez 2013; Gonzalez and Gonzalez 2014). Indeed, when variations
in the level of financial robustness of institutions tend to persist in time or to
get amplified, financial linkages among financially fragile banks represent a
propagation channel for contagion and a source of systemic risk (see Lorenz
and Battiston 2008; Battiston et al. 2012a). Moreover, our analysis shows
that another force plays a crucial role in causing financial distress, namely
the interest rate. When a lender accords a loan to an over-leveraged agent it
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applies, via the financial accelerator (see Bernanke and Gertler 1989, 1990;
Grilli et al. 2014, a,b) higher interest rate. This, in turn, worsens the fi-
nancial condition of the borrower itself pushing it towards the bankruptcy
state. If one or more borrowers are not able to pay back their loans, even
the lenders’ equity is affected by bad debts. Therefore, lenders reduce their
credit supply and increase the borrowers’ rationing. In this way, the profit
margin of borrowers decreases and a new round of failures may occur.
The problems arising from financial market interconnectedness have also
been highlighted by empirical studies, which have analyzed the properties
of credit networks during different phases of the economic cycle (Cocco et
al. 2009; Hale 2011; Schiavo et al 2010; Minoiu and Reyes 2011; Chinazzi et
al. 2012; Memmel and Sachs 2013; Tonzar 2015) and defined new analytical
tools able to better identify and monitor systemic risk and crisis transmis-
sion (Sornette and Von der Becke 2011; Kaushik and Battiston 2012; Catullo
et al. 2015).
The originality of this work in respect to previous mentioned models on
interbank networks is in the credit linkages evolution. In our framework
financial connections might change over time via a preferential attachment
evolving procedure (see Barabasi and Albert 1999; Tedeschi et al. 2014;
Grilli et al. 2014b) such that each financial institution can enter into a
lending relationship with others with a probability proportional to a fitness
measure. Specifically, we implement a compound fitness parameter, which
is a combination between banks’ supply of liquidity and their interest rate.
Banks can attract their customers by offering a higher supply of liquidity or a
lower interest rate. Our financial institutions, modeled as risk neutral agents
operating in a perfect competition environment, maximize their expected
profits and, consequently, set their optimal interest rate. The optimization
mechanism is designed such that bigger banks (i.e the more liquid ones) offer
higher interest rates, while the smaller ones (i.e the less liquid ones) seek to
attract customers by setting cheaper interest rates. From the point of view
of the borrowing banks, knocking on the door of a big financial institution
guarantees the loan satisfaction but at a high financing cost. Otherwise,
knocking on the door of a small institution increases the chance of credit
rationing but reduces financing costs. The fitness parameter, therefore, not
only identifies different banks’ strategies, but also behaviors that endoge-
nously evolve on the base of the agents’ size. Moreover, this method, based
on a compound fitness parameter given by two different banks’ strategies,
is able to reproduce different network topologies ranging from the random
graph to the scale-free one.
In each time period, we perturb the system with random liquidity shocks,
arising ultimately from the deposit and withdrawal patterns of customers.
Since liquidity fluctuations are unpredictable, a bank may find itself unable
to meet payment obligations due to the illiquidity of its available assets.
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If no interbank market is present, the mere inability to meet customer de-
mands triggers off failure. If interbank lending is possible, an illiquid bank
might seek funds not just to make payments but also to repay past creditors.
If despite such efforts, a bank ends up with insufficient funds, we assume for
the sake of simplicity that it closes down too.
An important difference distinguishes our “failure mechanism” from those
commonly used in physical and economic literature (see, for instance, Bat-
tiston et al. 2012a; Albert et al. 2000). All these models generate an
exogenous random (or targeted) attack and study the consequences of re-
moving a hit vertex on nodes connected to it and on the network structure.
In line with these studies, we generate a random attack via a liquidity shock
but, differently from them, not necessarily the hit node is removed. The
failure depends endogenously from node’s capacity to rise liquidity in the
interbank market and, lastly, from the network topology.
Our work is closely related to Lenzu and Tedeschi 2012 (LT hereinafter).
In their paper, the authors consider an interbank network where credit link-
ages evolve via a fitness parameter given by banks’ expected profit. By
changing the signal credibility that agents attribute to the counter-party
performance (i.e the expected profit) the interbank network evolves through
different architectures. Specifically, low values of the signal credibility char-
acterize random graphs with a Binomial (or Poisson) in-degree distribution,
exponential and scale-free topologies emerge for intermediate values of the
parameter, while the market self-organizes into a pseudo-star for higher val-
ues of the signal. By perturbing the system with liquidity shocks, the authors
test the network capacity to flow liquidity and its resilience. The authors
find that even though random networks are characterized by a low credibil-
ity signal, they are more efficient in re-allocating liquidity from banks that
have a surplus to the banks that have a shortage. Instead, as the network
becomes scale-free with the increase in the credibility signal, banks become
more prone to failure due to illiquidity. In particular, there would be just a
small number of highly trusted agents, leaving all others with very few credit
lines and hence being more exposed in case of negative liquidity shocks.
As in LT, we amplify our fitness measure with a multiplicative parameter
which represent the signal on banks’ attractiveness and shapes the inter-
bank network topology. On the one hand, when the signal is high, the
agents’ behavior is characterized by “herding”, a phenomenon which occurs
in situations with high information externalities, when agents’ private in-
formation is swamped by the information derived from directly observing
others actions. In this circumstance, few lenders gain the lion’s share of
borrowers, attracting a high percentage of in-coming links at the expense
of many feebly connected ones. On the other hand, when the signal is low,
agents “shop around”, the network does not condensed and the credit is
more uniformly distributed in the system.
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A significant difference characterizes the evolution of our interbank net-
work with respect to that of LT. We implement different banks’ strategies
which compete with each other. These strategies that parametrize the fit-
ness measure not only generate competition among banks, but also modify
endogenously the interbank network topology. In this circumstance, when
we modify the “signal credibility”, we are not only able to investigate how
different banks’ strategies perform in different network architectures, but
also to estimate the impact that these strategies have in generating different
network topologies.
Another relevant difference between this model and that of LT is the banks’
balance-sheet structure. The LT interbank market is a zero-liquidity system,
meaning that at the beginning and at the end of each period, banks hold no
liquidity. The liquidity, thus, is exogenously generated as positive shocks af-
fecting financial institutions. Specifically, each time period only two random
banks receive a liquidity shock of equal magnitude but opposite sign. The
bank receiving the negative shock becomes potential borrower, while the
bank hits by the positive shock become potential lender. All other interme-
diate nodes act as liquidity conduits, receiving and forwarding funds. This
assumption allows authors to define a flow network and solve the maximum-
flow problem by using the simple Ford-Fulkerson method. The use of an
interbank flow network allow the authors to analytically determine the liq-
uidity flow between any pair of banks in the market (see Ford-Fulkerson
1956; 1962). However assuming a zero-liquidity system means not to con-
sider the repayment mechanism between borrower and lender. In this work
we relax this hypothesis. Specifically, we apply multiple liquidity shocks on
the bank deposit motion (not bilateral as in LT) and model a repayment
mechanism between lenders and borrowers. The repayment mechanism,
which requires banks to repay installment and interest, has two important
consequences. First, it allows us to define a micro-founded interest rate,
whereas this is constant in LT. Second, it generates a more interesting dy-
namic in the agents’ failure. In fact, in the LT model bankruptcies depend
exogenously on the random attack and endogenously on borrower’s capacity
to rise liquidity in several interbank network topologies. In this model we
extend the two bankruptcy mechanisms presented in LT by adding a third
one based on the repayment scheme. Specifically, the repayment mechanism
can trigger an additional channel of failures. Starting from the failure of a
borrowing financial institution, this mechanism has a negative feedback on
the lender balance-sheet via bad debt. If the shock is big enough to com-
pletely erode the bank net-worth, then the lender itself will fail. Otherwise,
if the shock does not fully corrode the lender equity, then the bank survives.
However, in this circumstance, the “weakened” financial institution will at-
tempt to recover losses or by raising interest rates or decreasing the supply
of liquidity. In both cases, this attitude will further weaken the borrowing
banks with the result, therefore, of causing additional bankruptcies.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the model by analyzing the dynamic of the interbank network as well as the
functioning of the trading mechanism on the interbank system. In Section
3 we present the results of the simulations. Specifically, we proceed in two
steps: firstly, we provide a general overview of the credit network dynamics
by varying the credibility signal and banks’ strategies; secondly, we study
the impact of the different network topologies on contagion phases. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The model considers an interbank market in which financial institutions es-
tablish lending relationships. Each time period, banks receive stochastic
shocks to their liquid reserves which arise from the deposit and withdrawal
patterns of customers. Since liquidity fluctuations are unpredictable, banks
may find themselves unable to meet payment obligations due to the illiq-
uidity of their available assets. Credit relationships, therefore, allow the
liquidity exchange among market participants. Specifically, banks facing a
deposit increment become lenders in order not to accumulate excessive un-
productive liquidity, while financial institutions running into a deposit re-
duction beyond their liquid reserves become borrowers so as to repay their
creditors. The set of all bilateral lending agreements between lenders and
borrowers describes the interbank network where banks try to fulfill their
liquidity needs. The key element of the model is the mechanism describing
the dynamic evolution of credit relationships (links) among financial insti-
tutions. Each bank signals its capacity to grant credit via a fitness measure
which defines the bank ability in attracting clients. To this end, agents
adopt two strategies: on the one hand, they grab clients’ attention via their
liquidity supply, on the other hand via their interest rate. Each time period,
the financial institutions with liquidity requirements seek to establish, with
a certain probability, a credit relationship with the more attractive agent in
their neighborhood. This mechanism generates an endogenous evolution in
the credit agreements (links) which, therefore, re-design the credit network
architecture.
The essential details of the model time schedule are summarized in Fig.1.
From the methodological point of view, we adopt a pluralistic approach
which combines two techniques. On the one hand, the heterogeneous agents
approach reproduces the market microstructure and bank behaviour. On
the other hand, the network theory describes the interaction among banks
and “synthesizes” the resulting aggregate dynamics. The result of this plu-
ralistic approach firstly provides insights into the consequences that banks’
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Figure 1: Model time schedule.
strategies have on micro and macro performances and, then, highlights the
effect that different network topologies have on the resiliency and robustness
of the interbank system (see Bargigli et al. 2014, for an extensive survey).
2.1 The interbank credit relationships: a dynamic network
approach
We start the description of the model by explaining formation and evolu-
tion of the interbank network. In our network, nodes represent banks and
edges are the connective links between them. Links are directional, they are
created and deleted by banks who look for credit and point to the financial
institution that grants loan.
In general local interaction models agents interact directly with a finite
number of others in the population, the so-called “neighbors”. In our model
the number of out-going links is constrained to be d¯, thus borrowing banks
can only get loan from few lenders. There are two important reasons behind
it. On the one hand, in a highly connected random network, synchroniza-
tion could be achieved via indirect links. The impact of direct credit links
on the systemic risk is easier to be tested in a diluted network where indi-
rect synchronization is less likely to arise. On the other hand, by keeping a
fixed connectivity, we can easily compare the performance of different mar-
ket topologies to spread liquidity through the network.
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At any time t, the banking system is populated by N banks belonging
to the finite set Ωt = i, j, k, .... Financial institutions are interconnected by
credit relationships represented by the set Nt, whose elements are ordered
pairs of distinct banks. Banks (nodes or vertices) and their financial rela-
tionships (edges or links) form the financial network Gt(Ωt,Nt).
We implement an endogenous mechanism of preferential attachment
based on a compound fitness parameter. Specifically, we implement a fitness
function which is a linear combination between the bank liquidity and its
interest rate. Banks start with identical initial conditions, so that all agents
have the same initial liquidity and interest rate. As time goes by, some fi-
nancial institutions may become more liquid than others or offer rates lower
than their competitors. As a measure of the agent attractiveness we define
the fitness at time t as a combination between the bank liquidity relative to
the liquidity Cmaxt of the most liquid agent i
max and its interest rate relative
to that rmint of the cheapest financial institution:
φit = 
(
Cit
Cmaxt
)
+ (1− )
(
rmint
rit
)
. (1)
 measures the weight that the bank gives to the liquidity or to the interest
rate. When  is equal to zero, the bank strategy is in offering low rates
while, when  is equal to one, the strategy consists in providing high liquidity
supply.
The bank’s liquidity, Cit , in Eq. (1) comes from the inter-day bank balance-
sheet:
Cit +R
i
t + L
i
t = D
i
t + E
i
t , (2)
with assets (i.e liquidity Cit , reserves R
i
t and long term assets L
i
t) on the left
hand side of the identity and liabilities (i.e deposits Dit and equity E
i
t) on
the right hand side. Reserves Rit are a percentage of deposits, R
i
t = rˆD
i
t,
and the required reserve rate rˆ is in line with legal requirements and equal
to 0.02 . In our simple framework, the liquidity Cit corresponds to whole
supply of liquidity on the interbank market.
The interest rate rit in Eq.(1) comes from the expected profit of a loan from
the lender1 i to the borrower j:
E[Πi,jt ] = (1− pjt )ri,jt ci,jt + pjt (αAjt − ci,jt ) + δAjt − σAit. (3)
The parameters in the Eq. (3) should be interpreted as follows: pjt is the
borrower’s default probability, ci,jt is the maximum amount bank i is willing
1We identify with the index i a generic bank or a lending bank. The index j, otherwise,
identifies a borrowing bank.
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to lend to j, α is the liquidation cost of assets pledged as collateral, Ajt the
agent j’s assets and, δ and σ, are lender’s screening costs of establishing a
link. Eq.(3) requires that screening costs decrease with the dimension of the
borrower’s assets and increase with the lender’s dimension (see, for example,
Berger et al. 2001; Dell’Ariccia & Marquez 2004; Maudos et al. 2004).
Since empirical evidence is ambiguous on this relation, Appendix B analyzes
the model dynamics assuming the opposite scenario, that is screening costs
increasing with the borrower’s dimension and decreasing with the lender’s
one. The first term on the right hand side of Eq.(3) shows the expected
revenue if the borrower repays its obligation, the second term the expected
revenue in case of the borrower’s default (in this case borrower’s collateral is
sold) and the last two terms are the opportunity costs of the agreement. By
imposing Eq.(3) equal to zero and solving it for ri,jt , we obtain the interbank
interest rate ensuring zero expected profits:
ri,jt =
σAit − δAjt − pjt (αAjt − ci,jt )
(1− pjt )ci,jt
. (4)
Eq.(4), therefore, assumes that banks are risk neutral agents operating in
a perfect competition environment. The interest rate asked by the lender
i to the borrower j increases with the lender’s size (i.e its assets) and the
borrower’s financial fragility. In other words, we assume that the interest
rate charged by lenders embodies an external finance premium increasing
with the leverage, and, therefore, inversely related to the borrower’s net
worth. This assumption comes from the balance sheet identity (see Eq.2),
where we observe that the interest rate asked by the lender is a positive
function of the borrower’s leverage, λ, and a negative function of the lender’s
leverage: in fact Ait =
Lit
λit
+Dit, with λ
i
t =
Lit
Eit
.
In our model, therefore, the bank behaves as a lender in a Bernanke and
Gertler (1989, 1990) world characterized by asymmetric information and
costly state verification (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) for a
comprehensive exposition of the approach).
Moreover, the interest rate in Eq.(4) is not linearly related to the bank’s
probability of default pjt , and its capacity c
i,j
t . We implement a simple rule
of thumb for determining a proxy of the default probability of the borrower
j given by:
pjt =
(
1− E
j
t
Emaxt
)
. (5)
As we assume that our financial institutions go bankrupt when their equity
at time t becomes negative, Ejt ≤ 0, we implement a simple proxy of proba-
bility of bankruptcy in line with this idea: the higher the distance between
the equity of bank j with respect to that of bank with the highest equity,
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the higher its default probability2.
The lending capacity, ci,jt , in Eq.4, representing the maximum amount lender
i is willing to lend to j, is given by:
• ci,jt = (1− hjt )Ajt > 0 if (i, j) ∈ Nt
• ci,jt = 0 otherwise
where Aj are the assets pledged by borrower j to lender i as collateral
and hj ∈ (0, hmax] is the borrower haircut. We define the haircut as
hjt =
(
λjt
λmaxt
)
, with λjt =
Ljt
Ejt
to be the agent’s leverage.
Each borrowing bank j starts with some outgoing link with some random
agents (i.e borrowing position), and possibly with some incoming links from
other agents (i.e lending position). Links are rewired at the beginning of each
period, in the following way: each financial institution j cuts its outgoing
link, with agent i, and forms a new link, with a randomly chosen agent k,
with a probability
Prjt =
1
1 + e−β(φkt−φit)
(6)
or keep its existing link with probability 1 − Prjt . Thus, the probability
that a link exists between a pair of banks is equal to the fitted probability
from the logit regression (Vandenbossche et al. 2013; Tedeschi et al. 2012
and Tedeschi et al. 2014). The parameter β ∈ [0,∞] in Eq. 6 is the key
element generating different network structures. It represents the “inten-
sity of choice” and answers the question on how much financial institutions
trust the information about other agents’ performance. For 0 < β < 1
differences in fitness are smoothed, unchanged for β = 1 and amplified for
β > 1 (Domencich et al. 1975; Lenzu and Tedeschi 2012). The algorithm is
designed so that successful banks gain a higher number of incoming links.
Nonetheless, the algorithm introduces a certain amount of randomness, and
links to more successful banks have a finite probability to be cut in favor
of links to less successful banks. In this way, we model imperfect informa-
tion and bounded rationality. At the same time, the randomness also helps
unlock the system from the situation where all agents link to the same bank.
2.2 A stylized interbank trading mechanism
Each time period t, banks face deposit motions which modify their inter-day
balance-sheet (see Eq.2). Deposits evolve as follows:
Dit = D
i
t−1(1 + ηu
i
t), (7)
2The Eq. 5 can also be interpreted as a rule of thumb for determining the risk premium
that lenders charge to a borrower.
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where η is a constant and uit ∼ N (0, 1) is a normal noise.
On the one hand, banks running into a deposit reduction and with insuffi-
cient liquidity to meet the withdrawal, enter the interbank market as borrow-
ers. On the other hand, banks facing a deposit increment and, consequently,
a liquidity increase, enter the interbank market as lenders. The bank i debt
or credit positions in the interbank market are given by:
• borrower if ∆Dit + Cit ≤ 0, with demand of liquidity dit = |∆Dit + Cit |,
• lender if ∆Dit + Cit > 0, with supply of liquidity sit = ∆Dit + Cit ,
with ∆Dit to be the deposit variation between before and after the shock.
In our model, thus, liquidity shocks trigger the interbank market. Liq-
uid financial institutions become potential lenders, while illiquid banks can
try to borrow from financial institutions they have previously entered into
agreements with. Banks hit by the negative shock, thus, can raise funds
by exploiting their lending agreements and, when the gathered loan is not
enough to fully fulfill their liquidity need, by selling their long term assets, Lit
(see Eq.2). Given the long maturity of bank assets, we assume that banks
consider the asset sale as a second-best choice which occurs at extremely
discounted prices. Specifically, we define the granted loan from lender i to
borrower j as: li,jt = min(s
i
t, d
j
t ). The borrowing bank finding, via the inter-
bank market, enough loan to cope with the shock can deal with withdrawals.
On the contrary, the rationed bank j (i.e djt > s
i
t) has to sell an amount of
its long term asset equal to djt − sit = ρL˜jt , where ρ is the ‘fire-sale’ price
and L˜jt the amount of loan, L
j
t , bank j has to sell for covering its residual
liquidity need.
At the beginning of the next day, the repayment round takes place.
Banks run into a new deposit motion (see Eq. 7) increasing or decreasing
their liquidity. On one hand, lending banks facing a positive variation
of deposits (i.e ∆Dit ≥ 0), increase their cash and, consequently, remain
potential lenders. Otherwise, if they face a negative variation of deposits (i.e
∆Dit < 0), they become borrowers. On the other hand, borrowing banks
addressing a positive variation of deposits can fully repay their previous
loan if ∆Djt ≥ li,jt−1(1 + ri,jt−1)). Otherwise, if ∆Djt < li,jt−1(1 + ri,jt−1), they
have to sell their long term assets in order to repay creditors. The amount
of long term assets sold by j is: ρL˜jt = l˜
i,j
t−1(1 + r
i,j
t−1), with l˜
i,j
t−1 to be the
amount of interbank loan the borrower j has still to meet with. Borrowing
banks addressing a negative variation of deposits have to sell their long
term assets in order to pay their previous interbank loan and address the
new liquidity needs. In this circumstance, the amount of asset sold is: ρL˜jt =
l˜i,jt−1(1 + r
i,j
t−1) + ∆D
j
t . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that banks can
not renegotiate their debt position, but should extinguish it by the day.
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Banks unable to fully fulfill their liquidity need default. Bankrupt agents’
assets are liquidated in the claimants’ favor. In this case, involved lenders
incur a credit loss (i.e bad debt) equal to Bi,jt = (1− α− hjt )Ajt , net of the
collateral liquidation value. Borrowing and lending financial institutions
absorb, with their equity, the ‘fire-sale’ and bad debt losses. The generic
bank i net worth evolves according to:
Eit = E
i
t−1 +
∑
j
ri,jt−1l
i,j
t−1 −
∑
j∈Θit
Bi,jt − (1− ρ)L˜it, (8)
where Θit is the subset of the bank i clients unable to pay their debts back
because they go bankrupt. Financial institutions go bankrupt when their
equity at time t becomes negative, Eit ≤ 0. The failed banks leave the
market. When banks fail, they are replaced by new entrants, which are on
average smaller than incumbents. So, entrants’ size is drawn from a uniform
distribution centered around the mode of the size distribution of incumbent
banks (see Bartelsman et al. 2005).
3 Simulation results
We consider an economy consisting of N = 100 banks over a time span of
T = 1000 periods. Each bank is initially endowed with the same balance-
sheet: C0 = 30, L0 = 120, D0 = 135 and E0 = 15. Three are the parameters
entering into the interest rate. Specifically, we fix: δ = 0.05, σ = 0.02 and
α = 0.3.
We fix the number of out-going links, d¯ = 1, and the constant parameter in
Eq. 7, η = 0.035. The robustness of our qualitative results has been checked
by employing Monte Carlo techniques. We have run 100 independent simu-
lations for different values of the initial seed generating the pseudo-random
numbers. This exercise has been repeated by changing the parameter d¯ = 1,
which represents the number of bank’s potential lenders starting from 1 to 6
with steps of 2; and η = 0.035, which represents the variance of the deposit
shock3 starting from 0.01 to 0.06 with steps of 0.005. We have then studied
the moments of the distributions of the statistics of interest. Results in Ap-
pendix A confirm that our findings are quite robust.
In order to study the impact of the bank’s strategies on the financial dis-
tress, we run simulations for different values of the parameters A)  in Eq.
1, capturing the bank’s preference for a low interest rate (i.e  = 0) versus
a high liquidity (i.e  = 1) and B) β in Eq. 6, representing the intensity of
choice. For each investigation, we have repeated the simulations 100 times
with different random seeds.
3Furthermore, we have simulated the model using a different deposit low of motion
given by Dit = D
i
t−1(U(ξ,ζ)), with ξ = 0.6 and ζ = 1.2. Under a qualitative point of view,
our results do not consistently change by varying deposit shocks.
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3.1 The network topology
In this first experiment we analyze the evolution of the network topology by
varying β and . Specifically, we study the impact that the different banks’
strategies – banks can use a fitness measure based on a high liquidity (i.e
 = 1), on a low interbank interest rate (i.e  = 0) or a mixed strategies
which combines the two possibilities (i.e  = 0.5) – have on the network
topology by varying the intensity of choice β. In Fig.2 we show that, by
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Figure 2: Average number of clusters (left), average size of clusters (middle),
and network centrality (right), over all times and all simulations as a function
of β. The lowest interest rate strategy (i.e =0) is highlighted in black
solid line, the mixed strategy (i.e =0.5) in red dotted line, and the highest
liquidity one (i.e =1) in green dashed line. Colors are available on the web
site version.
increasing β, regardless of strategies, the network tends to centralize. The
existence of clusters of highly interconnected banks is an important empir-
ical evidence of credit networks (see, for instance, Boss et al., 2004). In
this work, a cluster is defined as a group of banks directly or indirectly con-
nected by lending relationships and corresponds to a so-called “connected
component” in network theory jargon4. Fig.2, left side, shows that, for small
values of β, the network tends to be fragmented in many (63 on average)
and small (2.5 on average) clusters of banks. However, for increasing β,
such clusters decrease in number while they increase in size and the net-
work becomes more clustered and centralized (see Fig.2, middle and right
panels). As the figure shows, the tendency of the network to condense, by
increasing β, is independent of the bank strategy : banks can use different
fitness measures but the intensity of choice plays a leading role. However,
Fig.2 shows that, for the two pure strategies (i.e  = 0 – black solid line–
and  = 1 – green dashed line –), the relationship between centralization
and intensity of choice is linear and increases at a very fast rate. The mixed
strategy, instead, performs in a different way: the network condensation is
low up to β equal to 10, then it reaches very high levels. Specifically, at β
4Connected communities have been performed using the appropriate R package (see
http : //igraph.org/r/doc/components.html).
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equal to 10, when  is 0.5, we observe a phase transition: the network jumps
from a decentralized one to a very condensed one.
In order to better identify the structure of the interbank network, we di-
vide the population in two subsets: the core and the periphery. Specifically,
we identify “core” banks (also said hubs) via the K-core decomposition of
graph5 (see Alvarez-Hamelin et al. 2005). This mechanism identifies the
k-core of a graph as the maximal subgraph in which each vertex has at least
degree k. Therefore, the k-core of the network is obtained by recursively
removing all vertices of degree less than k, until all vertices in the remaining
graph have degree at least k. Here, we fix k = 50%, while in Appendix A
we study the model performance for k equal to 75% and 85%, respectively.
The separation between core and periphery is essential to identify the effect
of each bank’s strategy. For any β, in fact, if the core represents agents with
higher fitness, the periphery shows the behavior of banks with the lower
fitness. In term of strategies, thus, if we use the liquidity fitness (i.e =1),
the core represents banks with the higher liquidity and, consequently, via
Eq.4, the higher interest rate. The periphery, instead, shows agents with
the lower interest rate and, consequently, lower liquidity6. In this simple
way, in the same scenario, we can analyze a strategy and its opposite. The
left panels in Fig.3 show that the average number of agents belonging to the
core (the periphery is just the reciprocal) and its average in-degree follow
the same pattern (in term of dynamics) of the cluster’s number and size as
displayed in Fig.2. Interestingly, our simulated results on the percentage of
banks belonging to the core and the periphery are quite in line with some
empirical studies. Specifically, Craig and von Peter 2014, by analyzing the
German interbank market, find that the periphery is larger and comprises
about the 90% of banks. Whereas, Fricke and Lux 2015, by analyzing the
e-MID trading platform, find a periphery consisting of roughly 72% of all
banks before the global financial crisis and 77% afterwards.
The figure, moreover, gives us an important information in term of agents’
strategies and, thus, fitness. The two pure strategies have a greater attrac-
tivity in terms of fitness, with the liquidity overlooking the interest rate. In
fact, for values of β between 0 and 10, we note that the attractivity of hubs
with the highest liquidity (green dashed lines) dominates that of hubs with
the lowest rate (black solid lines). The reason is that, in the model, up from
low values of the intensity of choice, the liquidity becomes very heteroge-
neous and, therefore, differences in terms of fitness amplified. Interest rates,
instead, are more homogeneous and, consequently, need of higher levels of β
5Another interesting approach to define the core-periphery networks is in Fricke and
Lux 2015.
6The opposite is true for  = 0. In this circumstance the core shows financial insti-
tutions with the lower interest rate and, consequently, the lower liquidity; the periphery,
otherwise, represents the more liquid banks with the higher rates.
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Figure 3: Average number of banks belonging to the core (top left panel) and
to the periphery (top right panel) and their average number of in-coming
links(bottom left and right for core and periphery respectively), over all
times and all simulations as a function of β. The lowest interest rate strategy
(i.e =0) is highlighted in black solid line, the mixed strategy (i.e =0.5) in
red dotted line, and the highest liquidity one (i.e =1) in green dashed line.
Colors are available on the web site version.
to condense the network. However, for values of β higher than 10, this effect
reverts: in this case a fitness measure based on a low interest rate prevails
on the one based on a high liquidity. With regard to the mixed strategy (red
dotted line), it needs high value of β to centralize the network but, how-
ever, the hubs never reach an attractivity as high as in pure strategies. This
result is in line with other studies which find evidence on the endogenous
formation of core-periphery interbank network just in presence of banks’
heterogenous size. Specifically, int’ Veld et al 2014, by developing a game-
theoretical network model calibrated on the Dutch interbank market, show
that a core-periphery network structure can form endogenously if one allows
for heterogeneity among banks in size. To prove that the different strate-
gies generate different levels of heterogeneity in the fitness distribution by
varying β, we estimate, on the upper tail of the distribution (from the 70th
percentile onward), the average exponent α of the power-law function and
its standard error by means of the Maximum Likelihood Method (MLM),
as in Clauset et al. (2009), over 100 simulations. Table 1 shows that, by
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MLM fitness, α and (st.dev)
 = 0.0  = 0.5  = 1.0
β = 0 2.30 (0.021) 2.30 (0.021) 2.30 (0.021)
β = 3 1.77 (0.035) 2.20 (0.038) 1.73 (0.041)
β = 5 1.51 (0.039) 2.00 (0.039) 1.40 (0.045)
β = 10 1.20 (0.034) 1.98 (0.044) 1.10 (0.051)
β = 50 0.98 (0.051) 1.20 (0.053) 1.02 (0.053)
β =∞ 0.98 (0.026) 1.08 (0.021) 1.01 (0.015)
Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Method (MLM) estimation of the power law
exponents α of the fitness distribution tails over the 100 simulations for
different values of  and β and their standard error.
increasing β, we generate a smooth transition to fatter tails. This result is
more evident for the two pure strategies, with a more evident heterogeneity
in the liquidity (i.e  = 1.0) with respect to the interest rate (i.e  = 0.0) up
to β equals 10. Then the effect reverses as shown by the sharp drop in the
power law exponents α in the case of  = 0.0 when β is greater than 10.
We now investigate the evolution of core banks along a dynamic path7.
The charts in Fig.4 show how the three different strategies impact on the
evolution of the network topology at different values of β: for β = 0 (first
column), β = 10 (second column) and β = ∞ (third column). Specifically,
the first and second row show the interest rate and the liquidity time series
of banks adopting the interest rate strategy (black solid line), the mixed
strategy (red dotted line) and the liquidity strategy (green dashed line).
Increasing β, the model is able to generate a stronger volatility of the two
variables for each strategy. Then, the bottom row of Fig.4 shows the agents’
incoming link time series. We observe that the volatility of the degree in-
creases with the intensity of choice as well. Last but not least, we have to
prove that the degree dynamics is driven by the fitness (i.e. by the interest
rate and the liquidity dynamics). In particular, the higher the fitness in a
single group, the higher the number of incoming links of banks belonging to
that group. A natural way to assess the co-movement between the increase
(decrease) in fitness and the increase (decrease) in the in-links is to study
their correlation. We find that the average Pearson correlation coefficient
over 100 simulations for each strategy is an increasing function of β and
reaches a value of 0.71 (st.dev 0.04) when the fitness signal strength is sig-
nificant. These results on the evolution of the network are in line with other
works (Brock et al. 1998; LeBaron et al. 2009; Tedeschi et al. 2014; Grilli
et al. 2014b).
7Results for peripheral banks are omitted, but similar in spirit.
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Figure 4: Time series of core interest rate (top row), liquidity (middle row)
and number of incoming links (bottom row) for β = 0 (first column), β =
10 (second column) and β = ∞ (third column). The lowest interest rate
strategy (i.e =0) is highlighted in black solid line, the mixed strategy (i.e
=0.5) in red dotted line, and the highest liquidity one (i.e =1) in green
dashed line. Colors are available on the web site version.
3.2 From banks strategies to financial distress
In this section we investigate the consequences that banks’ strategies have
on agents’ financial distress and on the network resiliency. Given the fitness
measure in Eq.1, we identify, as already stressed in previous sections, two
pure strategies, one based on the interest rate and the other one on the
liquidity, and a mixed one, based on a linear combination of the pure ones.
Top panels of Fig.5 show the average core and periphery banks’ lever-
age for the different strategies by varying the intensity of choice. Given
our naive banks’ balance-sheet, we define the leverage as assets on equity.
In this simple framework, thus, leverage is a good proxy of bank financial
fragility. Our results show that the financial fragility of the core is much
higher than that of the periphery. Although, on average, the core net-worth
is higher than the periphery one, it is not sufficient to compensate for the
high level of loans granted by core banks. Specifically, the average core eq-
uity (average periphery equity) over all β and  and all time steps and all
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Figure 5: Average core and periphery leverage (top left and right panel,
respectively), average core and periphery interest rate (bottom left and right
panel, respectively), over all times and all simulations as a function of β.
The lowest interest rate strategy (i.e =0) is highlighted in black solid line,
the mixed strategy (i.e =0.5) in red dotted line, and the highest liquidity
one (i.e =1) in green dashed line. Colors are available on the web site
version.
simulations is 17.47 (14.73) with standard deviation 0.23 (0.14). The average
loan granted by core banks (periphery banks) is 22.81 (11.43) with standard
deviation 1.13 (0.98). This result is in line with other empirical and theo-
retical studies showing that an increase in interbank market volume/loans
until a tipping point can be dangerous and generate contagion effects (see
Georg 2013; Fricke and Lux and 2015). Moreover, the leverage of core banks
increases with the intensity of choice β. This is because, by increasing β,
the number of core borrowers8 –and so the core loan– increases as shown
in the bottom panels of Fig.3, while the average core-equity decreases from
20.62 to 14.94. Last but not least, the two pure strategies are able to attract
more incoming links (i.e borrowers) than the mixed one, thus, generating a
greater fragility. On the other hand, the behavior of periphery banks is very
different in term of leverage. In this population, the growth of activities
better balance the growth of liabilities. Peripheral banks, in fact, manage
8Clearly, the average number of the core in-coming links is a proxy of the average
number of the core borrowers.
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to attract a number of clients – not too high– sufficient to increase their
net-worth more than their loans. In this scenario, an increasing number
of borrowers (i.e when β increases) is able to decrease the lenders’ finan-
cial instability. The periphery has advantages in never exceeding a critical
threshold in the number of customers.
The bottom panels of Figure 5 display the “behavior” of the interbank
interest rate for  equal to 0, 0.5 and 1, as a function of the intensity of
choice β. This behavior is strictly linked with the fitness measure and the
interest rate formula. We observe that, for the core banks, the interest rate
decreases with . Specifically,  equal to zero describes a strategy where
lenders try to attract clients applying a very low interest rate. However,
these lenders have a low supply of liquidity. Their customers, therefore, are
themselves advantaged by the low cost of credit, but may face severe credit
rationing. On the other hand,  one describes a world where lenders are
‘rich’, that is very liquid, and apply very high interest rates in return to a
low probability of rationing. Specifically, the average percentage of rationing
for the core-bank clients over all β and all time steps and all simulations is
1.3% for  = 0, 0.14% for  = 0.5 and 0.065% for  = 1.
The figure gives us, also, some interesting results in term of intensity of
choice. We can observe that, when  is equal to 1, by increasing β, the
interest rate increases, but at a decreasing rate. For high values of intensity
of choice, in fact, core banks become more poor. When the network is
very centralized, the core has too many clients and, consequently, faces an
excessive risk of insolvency, which reduces the core asset. It, in turn, tends
to reduce, a tiny bit, via Eq.4 the core interest rate. Table 2 confirms this
Bad-debt of core-banks
 = 0.0  = 0.5  = 1.0
β = 0 7.87 (1.95) 7.87 (1.95) 7.87 (1.95)
β = 3 5.70 (1.53) 7.22 (1.76) 6.04 (1.86)
β = 5 4.10 (1.23) 6.51 (1.6) 6.11 (1.85)
β = 10 4.76 (1.23) 6.57 (1.19) 11.68 (2.54)
β = 50 4.40 (1.23) 9.18 (1.31) 12.84 (1.21)
β =∞ 4.87 (1.95) 9.38 (1.32) 12.79 (1.95)
Table 2: Average bad-debt of core-banks and its standard error over time
and 100 simulations for different values of  and β.
result. Specifically, banks adopting the liquidity strategy (i.e  = 1) face
a growing insolvency in their customers’ repayments by increasing β. The
effect becomes very pronounced for β greater than 5, which corresponds to
the slow decline in the core interest rate.
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On the other hand, when  is equal to zero, by increasing β, the net-
work concentration increases and consequently the borrowers hunt lenders
offering interest rate increasingly lower. In other words, in this scenario,
when the network concentration increases, lenders obtain a higher number
of clients. However, when banks have many borrowers, their assets increase
and, consequently, via Eq.4 the interest rate tends to increase too. Since
the fitness measure, in this case, is designed in order to look at banks with
the lowest interest rate (which corresponds to a low supply of liquidity), by
increasing β we observe a strong switching able to re-direct the system to
banks with the lowest rate. Specifically, when  = 0, the average switch-
ing9 between borrowers and lenders takes values of 0.84 (st.dev. 0.01), 0.74
(st.dev. 0.03), 0.61 (st.dev. 0.02), 0.65 (st.dev. 0.01), 1.18 (st.dev. 0.10),
1.17 (st.dev. 0.11), for β = 0, 3, 5, 10, 50,∞, respectively. Otherwise, when
 = 1, the average switching linearly decreases from 0.84 (st.dev. 0.01),
when β = 0, to 0.17 (st.dev. 0.05), when β = ∞. Interestingly, the the-
oretical and empirical literature puts great emphasis on the relationship
between preferential lending –corresponding to low switching– and interest
rate. These studies show that preferential interest rates for borrowers with
strong attachment to a lender may guarantee the banks’ survival (see Iori
et al. 2015; Lux 2015, Temizsoy et al. 2015).
We now analyze the efficiency of banks’ strategies and interbank structure
in absorbing liquidity shocks which, in our framework, are driven by the
deposits’ motion. As Figure 6 shows, from a strategical point of view, the
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Figure 6: Average percentage of core and periphery banks failures (left and
right panel, respectively), over all times and all simulations as a function
of β. The lowest interest rate strategy (i.e =0) is highlighted in black
solid line, the mixed strategy (i.e =0.5) in red dotted line, and the highest
liquidity one (i.e =1) in green dashed line. Colors are available on the web
site version.
9The average switching between borrowers and lenders is defined as the average number
of times, over time-steps and simulations, each borrower changes its lender from period t
to period t+ 1.
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core banks have the highest benefit in applying the mixed strategies for any
different interbank network topology. This strategy, in fact, by maintaining
the number of bank client relatively lower respect to the two pure strate-
gies (and consequently a lower leverage), is able to contain the number of
banks’ failures. However, as shown for the number of incoming links and the
leverage (see Fig. 3-5) when the intensity of choice becomes very high (i.e
β > 10), the mixed strategy reaches the phase transition and, consequently,
we observe a sharp increase in bankruptcies (see Caccioli et al. 2014, for
similar results). This result clearly appears also in the analysis of the bad-
debt of banks adopting the mixed strategy. By observing the middle column
of table 2, in fact, we can notice the abrupt jump in the banks’ bad-debt for
β > 10. The efficiency of the two pure strategies is, instead, strongly related
with the interest rate and the leverage motion. On the one hand, when 
is equal to one, by increasing the intensity of choice (and so the network
centralization) the higher number of core clients generates a too high core
financial fragility and interest rate. Higher leverage coupled with higher in-
terest rate increases the core fragility via two effects. First, too much clients
are detrimental for the core because an increasing in the granted loan is not
counterbalanced by an increasing in net-worth. Second, the too high interest
rate paid by borrowers tends to dramatically increase the core bad debt, as
shown in the right hand side of table 2.
On the other hand, when  is equal to zero, core banks, by increasing β, tend
to offer too low interest rates. In this circumstance, the increasing number
of the core clients is not enough to compensate the very low profits given by
too low interest rates10.
When we analyze the effect of the three strategies on the periphery banks
by varying the intensity of choice (see right panel of Fig.6), we observe a
very different behavior. It is important to notice that, in this circumstance,
strategies are reversed. Specifically, when  is equal to one, the periphery
banks apply a strategy which offers low rates in the face of a small liquidity
supply, on the other hand, when  equals zero, they apply higher rates in
return for a high liquidity. This is simply due to the fact that the periphery
has a fitness measure opposite to the core. By analyzing this population
we learn an important lesson. In this scenario, the lenders requiring higher
10It is worthy of note that, when banks choose the strategy  = 0, a negative relation
between the interest rate and the banks’ failure emerges (see black solid lines in the bottom
left panel of Fig. 5 and in the left panel of Fig. 6). This phenomenon reflects the fact
that the failing banks are small lenders who (i) offer lower interest rates, all else equal,
(ii) are more fragile because of their low margins and (iii) are increasingly prevalent in
the core as the competition for offering low interest rates intensifies in a scenario where
fitness depends only on interest rates. In this case, a parallel with real banking crisis is
not apt as in those crises the idea is that interbank interest rates are driven by increasing
risk premia charged to borrowers. Anyway, this contingency is interesting, as it shows the
negative impact that low interest rates may have on the financial robustness of lending
banks via too low profit margins.
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interest rates (i.e  = 0) are more resistant in facing shocks. By increasing
β, all three strategies face a contraction in the number of customers, which
is particularly evident at β greater than 5 (see bottom right panel in Fig.3).
The dynamics in the periphery in-degree is, however, quite similar for all
the three strategies. What changes, instead, is the behavior of the interest
rate (see bottom right panel in Fig.5). Periphery banks using the strategy
 = 0 are able to apply higher rates (with a maximum around 11%) but,
otherwise, they never reach a level of the rate as high as to be detrimental
to them as, however, is the case of core banks under the strategy  = 1. The
model, then, identifies a minimum and a maximum interest rate, above or
below which banks fail either for low profits or for insolvent customers.
0 3 5 10 50 inf
beta
4%
8%
12%
a v
e . p
e r c
e n
t a g
e  o
f  f
a i l
u r e
s
0 3 5 10 50 inf
beta
10
15
20
25
30
35
a v
e . B
a d
- d e
b t
0 3 5 10 50 inf
beta
10
15
20
25
a v
e .  
c r e
d i t
 s t
a n
d a
r d  
d e
v i a
t i o
n
Figure 7: Average percentage of banks failures (left), average bad-debt (mid-
dle) and average credit standard deviation (right), over all times and all
simulations as a function of β. The lowest interest rate strategy (i.e =0) is
highlighted in black solid line, the mixed strategy (i.e =0.5) in red dotted
line, and the highest liquidity one (i.e =1) in green dashed line. Colors are
available on the web site version.
The last part of this session is dedicated to the analysis of the fragility
of the interbank system as a whole. In this regard, we investigate the aggre-
gate dynamics in term of whole failures and bad debt (see Fig. 7 left and
middle panels, respectively). As the figure shows, aggregate failures follow a
trend very similar to that of the core bankruptcies. At the aggregate level,
however, some features are more pronounced. Firstly, the strategy based on
a high supply of liquidity is the one that worse performs in terms of failures
and bad-debt. In fact, the too high interest rate and the too strong lenders’
fitness are deleterious for banks using this strategy. Secondly, the mixed
strategy overperforms the other two tactics in terms of lower risk and lower
bad debt up to a value of β ≤ 10. When the intensity of choice reaches
the phase transition, instead, we observe a competition in term of riskiness
(i.e percentage of failures) between the mixed strategy and the interest rate
one. In this circumstance, a clear supremacy of one strategy over the other
does not emerge anymore, as shown by the high standard deviation in case of
high levels of β (see left panel of Fig. 7). To better quantify this observation
we compare the average percentage of failure for  = 0 with those obtained
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for  = 0.5, over 100 simulations, by applying the two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) goodness-of- fit hypothesis test. The test confirms that the
historical series of failures for the two samples (for any level of β > 10), are
drawn from the same population at a significance level of 0.05. The analysis
of the bad debt, instead, would seem to suggest best performances of the
interest rate strategy with respect to the mixed one, for β > 10 (see mid-
dle panel of Fig.7). However, it is worthy of note that the tactic based on
the interest rate produces the highest probability of rationing, which clearly
corresponds to the lowest bad debt. Specifically, the average percentage of
rationing is 10.25% for  = 0, 4.01% for  = 0.5 and 1.23% for  = 1. The
higher probability of rationing for  = 0 is motivated by two factors: i)
lenders adopting this tactic are less liquid and smaller in size and, therefore,
easily cut the granted loans ii) the network emerging when financial insti-
tutions apply the interest rate strategy is very sparse, then some borrowers,
which are isolated nodes, are fully rationed and, consequently, do not have
any bad-debt.
Last but not least, the right panel of Fig.7 displays the credit volatility,
which can be considered as a synthetic measure of interbank fragility. As
the empirical literature well documents, the standard deviation of credit is
a good proxy of financial and macroeconomic uncertainty (see Baum et al.,
2004; Ghosal and Loungani, 2000). The figure shows that the credit volatil-
ity increases with the intensity of choice for any strategy. This confirms a
key finding of the model: an overly centralized network, where few lenders
manage several borrowers, is unstable and very fragile, as proved by the
strong weakness emerging when banks adopt the strategy based on the high
supply of liquidity.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied, in a very simple framework, the impact of
different network topologies on banks’ financial fragility. By implementing
an endogenous attachment mechanism which evolves via a fitness measure
based on three different banks’ strategies, we have investigated how sys-
temic risk emerges from the interaction and which network topology and
bank strategy are more resilient against a random attack to vertices. In
all the investigated scenarios, our findings have shown that the system vul-
nerability is strongly related with the network concentration. When in the
interbank system we have a narrow core, corresponding to very few hubs act-
ing as lenders, we observe high leverage often associated with high financial
fragility. Network concentration leads core banks to grant too much credit
compared to their equity and, consequently, in the unlike event of shock,
to be overwhelmed by their debtors’ insolvency. We have shown that this
result holds even if core banks charge high interest rates in return for their
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high liquidity supply (i.e. when  = 1). The application of this strategy,
in fact, produces strong negative feedbacks. On the one hand, core banks
grant too much loan with respect to their liquidity and, thus, become very
illiquid in case of shock. On the other hand, by applying too high interest
rates to their borrowers, they are likely to have many insolvent customers
and, consequently, through the bad debt which erodes their equity, to fail
themselves. When core banks, otherwise, apply very low interest rates to
their clients, (i.e. when  = 0), they suffer from an excessive erosion of their
profits that turns out to be very harmful. The model identify, then, a mixed
strategy which, by combining not too high (or too low) interest rates with
a network concentration below the transition phase, appears to be the most
efficient in case of liquidity shocks.
Given its stylized framework, the model can be easily extended and
modified to allow for different analyses. For instance, efficient responses
to cascading disaster spreading could be identified. This important point
could be addressed by adding a Central Bank and analyzing the best policies
for reducing the interbank market vulnerability. Furthermore, in a future
article we will introduce a proper utility function from which to derive bank’s
supply of liquidity and we will perform a more careful study of how the
results depend on the agents’ microfounded strategies.
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Appendix A. Robustness analysis on the model pa-
rameters
In this Appendix we analyze the robustness of the model by changing some
key parameters. Specifically, we evaluate the sensitivity of some simulated
time series with respect to the choice of the number of bank’s potential
lenders, d¯, to the variation of the percentage of core banks, k, and, then, to
the variance of the deposit shock, η.
Firstly, we investigate how the model dynamics change with d¯. We focus
the study on the two variables which are mainly affected by the variation
of the parameter, namely the network centrality and the percentage of fail-
ures. Fig.8 displays the average network centrality for the three different
strategies as a function of β. Specifically, each panel represents a distinct
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level d¯, equal to 1, 3 and 5, respectively. By increasing d¯, ceteris paribus,
the centralization slightly increases. Although this result is trivial – it is, in
fact, obvious that the higher the number of lenders each borrower can look
at the higher the network centralization – it clarifies an important finding:
by increasing d¯, the higher network centralization is associated with a faster
centralization in terms of β (i.e. by raising d¯, the network centralizes for
lower value of intensity of choice, β). Moreover, for any value of d¯ > 3
(see right panel of Fig.8), each variation of β, ∀β > 3, does not produce
any change in the network topology. This result clarifies the importance of
maintaining d¯ low and constant in order to better analyze the effect of β.
Fig.9 shows the strong correlation between network centrality and banks’
failures. As Fig.9 shows, to high levels of centralization, due both to high
levels of d¯ and/or to high levels of β, corresponds a high mortality of banks.
Last but not least, we observe that, by increasing d¯, the impact of the differ-
ent strategies on the aggregate banks failures does not qualitatively change.
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Figure 8: Average network centrality, over all times and all simulations as a
function of β. Left panel d¯ = 1; middle panel d¯ = 3, right panel d¯ = 5. The
lowest interest rate strategy (i.e =0) is highlighted in black solid line, the
mixed strategy (i.e =0.5) in red dotted line, and the highest liquidity one
(i.e =1) in green dashed line. Colors are available on the web site version.
Secondly, we analyze the robustness to the variation of the network k-core.
Specifically, we investigate the model performance for k = 75% and k = 85%.
As shown in the top row of Fig.10, where the average number of core banks
for k = 75% (left panel) and k = 85% (right panel) is displayed, the higher is
k, the lower the number of core banks. Moreover, by increasing the intensity
of choice, β, the number of core clients increases (see second row of Fig.10).
This behaviour remains unchanged by modifying k.
It is worthy of note that, by varying k from 50% to 85%, the model re-
produces similar dynamics in terms of strategies and intensity of choice.
However, by comparing the left panels of Fig.3 with the first and second
row of Fig.10, we observe that, by increasing k, the model dynamics be-
comes “more linear” when β rises. Specifically, the spikes present in left
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Figure 9: Average percentage of banks failures, over all times and all simu-
lations as a function of β. Left panel d¯ = 1; middle panel d¯ = 3, right panel
d¯ = 5. The lowest interest rate strategy (i.e =0) is highlighted in black
solid line, the mixed strategy (i.e =0.5) in red dotted line, and the highest
liquidity one (i.e =1) in green dashed line. Colors are available on the web
site version.
panels of Fig.3 (see, in particular, the spike in the average number of core
banks at β = 10 for the mixed strategy and the abrupt change in the average
number of core in-links at β = 5 for  = 1) disappear. The explanation is
quite intuitive: by decreasing the core size, we are decreasing the chances of
switching between core and periphery and, consequently, we are generating
more stable dynamics for each β. In other words, the higher k, the smaller
the number of core banks, but the longer their permanence in the core and,
therefore, the higher the stability of the system itself. By increasing k from
50% to 85%, in fact, the average switching between core and periphery over
time and simulations decreases by the 42% (st.dev 4.12%). The other in-
vestigated variables show similar behaviors. Specifically, by varying k, the
leverage and interest rate of core banks (see third and fourth row of Fig.10)
maintain their characteristics for the different strategies and values of inten-
sity of choice, but they smooth jumps.
Last but not least, the bottom row of Fig.10 shows the average percentage of
core banks failures, as a function of β for k = 75% (left panel) and k = 85%
(right panel). Also in this case, for any k, core banks have the highest ben-
efit in applying the mixed strategy for any β. Furthermore, by increasing k,
we observe the same “linearization” in the model performances. Results for
peripheral banks are consistent with our analysis and available upon request.
Lastly, we analyze the robustness to the variation of the variance of the
deposit shock, η. Specifically, we study, for each of the three different strate-
gies the average percentage of banks failures and its standard deviation for
each value of intensity of choice by varying η from 0.01 to 0.06 with steps
of 0.00511. Results confirm that the variation of η, by maintaining constant
β, ∀, does not change the average percentage of banks failures. This re-
11Numerical results are omitted by available upon request.
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Figure 10: Average number of core banks (first row) and their incoming links
(second row). Average core leverage (third row) and interest rate (fourth
row). Average percentage of core failures (bottom row). In the left panels
for k = 75%; in the right panels and for k = 85%. The strategy =0 is
highlighted in black solid line, the strategy =0.5 in red dotted line and the
strategy =1 in green dashed line.
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sult is confirmed by the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test which
supports that the historical series of failures by varying η, but keeping the
strategy and β fixed, are drawn from the same population at a significance
level of 0.05. Understanding this result is quite intuitive: the variance of
the deposit shock affects positively and negatively the banks’ liquidity, by
making lenders (i.e. agents receiving the positive shock) more liquid and
borrowers (i.e. agents negatively attacked) more in need. This generates an
off-setting between the two positions which leaves the average unchanged.
What varies, however, is the standard deviation in the percentage of banks
failures which, obviously, increases with η.
Appendix B. Different derivations of the interest
rate equation
The relationship between screening costs and interest rate has been widely
explored in the economic literature and often associated with the imperfect
information paradigm (see Aleem 1990; Bester 1985; Hoff and Stiglitz 1990
). Following this interpretation the explanation for high interest rate lies
in the problem of asymmetric information. Specifically, lenders having less
information than borrowers about the latter’s ability and willingness to re-
pay a loan have to screen applicants and charge the cost of this operation
on borrowers. However, it is very rare to find evidence about the costs as-
sociated with screening and, more generally, about the effect of imperfect
information on the behavior of credit market participants.
In the previous analysis, we assumed the interest rate as an increasing
function in the lender’s dimension and decreasing in the borrower’s size.
This hypothesis allowed us to distinguish between the two pure strategies.
Specifically, we modeled a strategy,  = 1, where the high liquidity corre-
sponded to the high interest rate and one,  = 0, where the low interest rate
corresponded to a low liquidity. Here, we modify Eq.4 in order to investigate
two different scenarios. Firstly, we model an interest rate which increases
with the borrower’s size and decreases with the lender’s one. Then, we in-
clude in the original Eq. 4 a reference interest rate fixed by the Central
Bank.
Let us firstly consider the case where screening costs decrease with the
dimension of the borrower’s assets and increase with the lender’s dimension.
This implies a modification of Eq.3 in the following way:
E[Πi,jt ] = (1− pjt )ri,jt ci,jt + pjt (αAjt − ci,jt )− δAjt + σAit. (9)
Consequently, the new setting rule for the interbank interest rate becomes:
ri,jt =
δAjt − σAit − pjt (αAjt − ci,jt )
(1− pjt )ci,jt
. (10)
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This implies an inverse relation between the lender’s size and the interest
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Figure 11: Average percentage of core failures (top left panel), average num-
ber of core in-coming links (top right panel), average core interest rate (bot-
tom left panel) and average core size (bottom right panel), over all times
and all simulations as a function of β. The strategy =0 is highlighted in
black solid line, the strategy =0.5 in red dotted line and the strategy =1
in green dashed line. Results are obtained using Eq. 10.
rate the financial institution offers on the interbank market: the most liquid
lender offers the best conditions in terms of interest rate. In this circum-
stance, the two different banks’ strategies, described in the fitness (see Eq.
1), collapse to the same one. Specifically, on the one hand, the strategy
based on the higher liquidity (i.e  = 1), via Eq.10, now describes a situa-
tion where the most liquid agent corresponds to the one offering the lowest
interest rate. On the other hand, the strategy based on the lower inter-
est rate (i.e  = 0) now characterizes a world where the cheapest lender in
term of interest rate is also the most liquid one. Since the banks’ strategies
go in the same direction, their impact on the simulated dynamics is simi-
lar. As Fig.11 shows there are no statistically significant results in terms
of strategies in the investigated series. In fact, as highlighted by the high
standard deviation among the three strategies, their impact on core failures,
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in-coming links, interest rate and banks’ size is equivalent. However, what
is relevant is the impact of β. In fact, by increasing the intensity of choice
the percentage of core failures increases (see top left panel of Fig.11). The
network becomes centralized and lenders have too many customers (see top
right panel) paying too low interest rates12 (see bottom left panel). The
combined effect of many customers paying low rate produces the interbank
market “collapse”.
We now briefly describe a world where banks set their interest rate also
according to a common reference rate. This analysis requires the modifica-
tion of the expected profit by adding a reference interest rate, r¯, fixed to
2%. According to this modification the expected profit of a loan from the
lender i to the borrower j becomes:
E[Πi,jt ] = (1− pjt )r¯ci,jt + (1− pjt )ri,jt ci,jt + pjt (αAjt − ci,jt ) + δAjt − σAit. (11)
All parameters in the Eq. (11) must be interpreted as in the Sec. 2.1, with
the only exception for the the first term on the right hand side of Eq.(11).
This, in fact, shows the expected revenue if the borrower repays its obligation
at a fixed interest rate. By imposing Eq.(11) equal to zero and solving it
for ri,jt , we obtain the new interbank interest rate ensuring zero expected
profits:
ri,jt =
σAit − δAjt − pjt (αAjt − ci,jt )
(1− pjt )ci,jt
− r¯. (12)
As the reader can notice, the introduction of this component just changes the
level of the interest rate but does not affect the heterogeneity of the offered
interest rate. Our simulated results show that the introduction of a fixed
interest rate does not affect any of the investigated dynamics. Although the
results shift up or down, the effects in term of strategies and intensity of
choice remain unchanged. Figures are omitted but available upon request.
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